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Introductory Briefings for DCI-Designee
(Approximately 1 hour ea.)

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Briefer</u>
Overview of Agency Organization, to Include EAG	E. H. Knoche
The Intelligence Community and the Role of the DCI	<div data-bbox="1036 730 1399 766" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 224px; height: 17px;"></div> Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community
Preparations for Confirmation	George L. Cary, Jr. Legislative Counsel
Legal Authorities Relating to the DCI	Anthony Lapham General Counsel
The National Intelligence Officers: Their Functions, Including Their Role in the Production of National Intelligence Estimates	Richard Lehman* Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Organization of the DCI's Office and ES Functions	Benjamin C. Evans Executive Secretary
The Directorate of Intelligence, Organization and Functions (Including Intelligence Support to the White House and the NSC)	Sayre Stevens* Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Directorate of Operations, Organi- zation and Function (Including OAG)	William Wells* Deputy Director for Operations
The Directorate of Science and Technology, Organization and Function (Including Special Projects and the NRO)	Leslie Dirks* Deputy Director for Science and Technology
The Directorate of Administration, Organization and Function (Including Special Proprietarys)	John F. Blake* Deputy Director for Administration

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Subject

Briefer

Agency Congressional Relations

George L. Cary, Jr.
Legislative Counsel

Agency Relations with the Media;
Agency Information Policy

Andrew Falkiewicz
Assistant to the DCI

CIA Programs, Budget and Manpower
(Including relations with OMB)

DDCI and
James Taylor
Comptroller

Functions of the Inspector General
and Current Cases of Major Importance

John Waller
Inspector General

* Detailed briefing topics attached.

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IC/Staff

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14 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Benjamin C. Evans, Jr.
Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat

FROM: Richard J. Kerr
Executive Officer, Intelligence Community
Staff

SUBJECT: Briefing of the New DCI on the Intelligence
Community, the DCI Committees, and
the ICS

The following agenda for briefings on the Intelligence
Community is suggested.

SUBJECT	BRIEFER	TIME REQUIRED	
I. Organization and Functioning of the Intelligence Community	[Redacted] D/DCI/IC	45 Minutes	25X1
The CFI, its Record and Future			
II. Organization and Mission of the ICS	Mr. John McMahon AD/DCI/IC	15 Minutes	
Planning and Priorities	[Redacted] D/OPP	15 Minutes	25X1
Program and Budget Development	[Redacted] D/OPBD	20 Minutes	25X1
Performance Evaluation and Improvement	[Redacted] D/OPEI	20 Minutes	25X1
Congressional Oversight	[Redacted] SA-D/DCI/IC	15 Minutes	25X1
III. The DCI Committees (Introduction and Briefing on the NFIB)	Mr. Walter Elder Executive Secre- tary, CFI/NFIB	10 Minutes	
Briefing by Each Committee Chairman	12 Chairmen	10 Min's Each (120 Min. Total)	25X1
	[Redacted]		

Richard J. Kerr

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505


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4 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Guidelines for National Intelligence Production

1. I have approved the attached guidelines for national intelligence production. In so doing, I am stating my strong support for the National Intelligence Officer concept.
2. The Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence will organize the Intelligence Advisory Panel and the steering group called for in Paragraph 6.
3. Issuance of a revised DCID 1/1 will be deferred until satisfactory procedures involving these new entities have been evolved. In the interim, present procedures for the production of National Intelligence Estimates and related papers will remain in force.


George Bush

Attachment:
Guidelines for National
Intelligence Production

Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

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Attachment
NFIB-D-14.2/2
4 June 1976

National Production

1. Organizational Location: Responsibility for national intelligence production, other than current, will be lodged in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with Executive Order 11905.

2. National Intelligence Officers: The National Intelligence Officers will constitute the DCI's staff for this purpose.

- a. The NIO structure will be headed by the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence. He will work in close cooperation with the DCI's Deputies for the Agency and for the Community.
- b. Each NIO will be a senior staff officer who will serve the DCI directly as senior counselor on his assigned area of substantive responsibility.
- c. The NIOs will be drawn as broadly as possible from elements of the Intelligence Community, other government components, and outside government. In principle, NIO assignments will be rotational for two to three years.
- d. The number of NIOs and the apportionment of portfolios among them will depend on the DCI's perception of his needs at any given time.

3. Responsibilities: The NIOs will be responsible to the DCI for:

- a. Supervising non-current* national production including:

* *Current intelligence at the national level will continue to be a responsibility of CIA. CIA and the NIOs will concert to avoid inconsistency in substantive reporting.*

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- Formal National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates
 - National Intelligence Analytical Memoranda
 - Interagency intelligence memoranda and studies
 - Intelligence Alert Memoranda
 - Selected DCI briefings
 - Other analyses and assessments of varying degrees of formality requested by senior consumers -- or commissioned to fill an obvious need -- whose preparation involves the work of more than one component of the Intelligence Community.
- b. Providing a coordinating mechanism, operating on behalf of the DCI, to focus the talents and resources of all Community components on problems of particular importance.
- c. Maintaining continual dialogue with senior consumers at the Assistant Secretary level or above, or their military equivalents, to ensure that they receive the best possible intelligence support, and to provide a channel for continuous feedback on intelligence matters. This responsibility will also include providing for the policy level consumer one point of contact to which he can turn for any form of intelligence support, knowing that his request will be passed on to those elements of the Community best equipped to handle it.
- d. Within the Intelligence Community, developing and maintaining contact among all who work on any given substantive area -- collectors, analysts and producers.

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- e. Maintaining contact with knowledgeable experts outside the government to ensure that intelligence production benefits from the full range of thinking in the United States.
- f. Developing major substantive requirements and providing assistance to the evaluation of intelligence performance, in cooperation with the Deputy Director, Community and his staff.
- g. Performing any other tasks the DCI assigns.

4. Production Mechanism:

- a. The NIOs will not normally function as a production office.* The NIO structure will not include a drafting staff.
- b. The actual drafting of national products will be done by line officers drawn from the Community components best equipped to handle the particular project in question.**
- c. The drafting of national products will be done under the supervision of the NIO responsible for the project in question. A draft so produced will not be viewed as an institutional product, i.e., neither the office nor the component to which the drafter(s) belong will be obligated to support the draft during the coordination process.
- d. After a draft has been produced and reviewed, it will be submitted to concerned line components for coordination and discussion. The precise nature of these coordination procedures will vary with the formality of the document -- NIEs and SNIEs being the most formal. In every instance, however, line entities will have ample

* There will be occasional instances where, on matters of great sensitivity, some senior official will ask for a substantive comment quietly prepared by a single person.

** Procedures for minimizing the disruption of line offices' work and erosion of line command jurisdiction entailed by this approach are outlined in Paragraph 6.

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opportunity to express their views and the NIO responsible will be under an obligation to ensure that the final product fairly reflects significant differences of opinion.*

5. Collegial Review (The Intelligence Advisory Panel):

One criticism of the current approach has been that national products do not, at any stage in their production, receive a collegial review. This deficiency will be rectified by the creation of an Intelligence Advisory Panel to the DCI.

- a. This Panel will consist of approximately three dozen highly-qualified people drawn from a variety of disciplines. The Panel will be recruited from within the Intelligence Community, the non-intelligence components of the government, and -- to the extent feasible -- the outside world: academia, industry and journalism.
- b. The optimum point for collegial review in the production process is after the basic draft is prepared and before it is circulated for coordination. Consequently, for each NIE/SNIE or other significant national product (deadlines permitting), three people will be picked from the Intelligence Advisory Panel to go over that particular paper in draft.

-- The Panel members involved will meet in Washington and spend whatever time is necessary going over the draft with the NIO, the project chairman and the drafters. They will critique the draft for balance and objectivity, ensuring that it addresses the right questions, is clear and cogent, and

* *Coordination among Intelligence Community components is an essential feature of the production of truly national products. The concept of coordination does not involve the development of consensus judgments. Divergent views will be submitted to debate among knowledgeable experts, but where significant differences on important issues remain unresolved, they will be reflected in the final finished product so that policy level consumers will be fully aware that there are such differences, what they are, and what are their bases.*

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takes proper account of ancillary issues and critical variables.

- Membership on the Intelligence Advisory Panel will not entail a large expenditure of time over a prolonged period, but rather a willingness to work intensively for periods of short duration. (The reason for having so large a Panel is to ensure that on any given national product three good reviewers will be available.)

- c. The Intelligence Advisory Panel can also advise the DCI on the overall quality of the national production effort and can engage in that effort the best talent available in the United States. While the Panel will seldom, if ever, meet as a whole, various members of it can and will be convened to participate in seminars or discussion groups critiquing the totality of our effort in various fields.
- d. Although the Panel will be advisory to the DCI, its normal point of contact with the DCI's office will be D/DCI/NI.

6. Minimizing of Line Disruption: Since the NIO structure will not have its own independent drafting staff and will be forced to borrow talent from line components, some intrusion on line offices is inevitable. The amount of this intrusion, however, will be minimized by the following steps:

- a. The D/DCI/NI will be responsible for ensuring that requests for intelligence support levied on the Intelligence Community through the NIOs do not overburden the system. Should this occur, he will raise this problem directly with requesting consumers to refine their requests or put them in priority order, and will advise the DCI on the problems involved as appropriate.

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- b. The D/DCI/NI will chair a steering group that will include the heads of the major production components of the Intelligence Community. This group will meet regularly to review the national production effort and ensure that the workload is properly and fairly distributed. It will keep under continuing review production schedules and requests for specific projects involving extensive work to ensure that tasking for national products is handled with the greatest efficiency and least disruption to line components.
- c. Each NIO will be specifically charged with levying his requirements through the appropriate chain of command of the Intelligence Community components involved. The procedures used by each NIO with each component will be worked out to the satisfaction of the component's head.
- d. Any component head who feels that NIO-sponsored tasking is disrupting his office should take this matter up initially with the NIO involved, then with the D/DCI/NI and -- if that does not prove satisfactory -- directly with the DCI.

7. Credit for National Products:

- a. When a national product involves the work of more than one Intelligence Community component, identification of the offices and components contributing to it will be prominently noted in the document.
- b. Where a request from a senior consumer, passed through the NIO structure, is met by a product which is predominantly the work of a single Community component, that component will issue the response. It will be forwarded by the NIO to the consumer with the transmittal note calling attention to the fact that the consumer's request was taken care of by the attached "CIA Memo," "DIA Memo," etc.

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8. The CIA Relationship: One of the NIOs' main functions is to help knit the Community together as an organic whole and, in producing national intelligence, draw on the totality of Community resources. The NIOs will, however, have a special relationship with CIA, growing naturally from the fact that CIA, as the only producing organization fully dedicated to national intelligence needs, plays a proportionately larger role in national production. Arrangements will be worked out with the Deputy for CIA to ensure that he is kept abreast of the uses that the NIOs are making of CIA resources.

9. Relations with the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community: The relationship between the NIO structure and the Deputy Director, Community will obviously have to be a close and cooperative one -- particularly with respect to the DCI committees (formerly USIB committees) on which the NIOs will have to rely and for which the Deputy Director, Community has supervisory responsibility.

- a. Arrangements will be devised to ensure a mutually supportive relationship between the NIO structure and the Intelligence Community Staff to:
 - Give the Deputy Director, Community guidance with respect to basic needs, requirements, future perspectives, etc;
 - Help him strike the right balance between resources and substantive needs, matching the former to the latter wherever possible but arranging substantive needs in priority order.
 - Assist the Deputy Director, Community in his and his staff's evaluation work.
- b. These arrangements will be structured to minimize areas of non-productively overlapping responsibilities. The NIOs, for example, will be in continuous touch with consumers to stay abreast of their evolving needs; the IC Staff will be responsible for evaluation of products and services -- but both will contribute to giving the DCI overall assessments of the Community's total performance.

National Intelligence Officers

The National Intelligence Officer concept was developed by former Director Schlesinger and refined and implemented by Mr. Colby. It is an effort to solve an inherently intractable organizational and management problem: to provide a mechanism that can cut across the internal organizational lines of all Community components so that all of the Community's resources can be efficiently focused on major substantive problems, but that does not interfere with the internal line management of Community components or involve any reorganization of their line functions. Mr. Bush, upon becoming DCI, conducted an extensive review of the national intelligence system and reaffirmed his strong support for the NIO concept.

The NIOs exist to support the DCI and are part of his office. Within his or her geographic or functional area of responsibility, each NIO serves as the DCI's principal staff officer, advisor, and substantive representative. Each NIO is charged with viewing the problems of his or her area and the entire range of US intelligence activities and resources related to it as the DCI would view them if he could devote full time to that area. The NIOs, however, have no direct command authority over anyone (except their assistants and secretaries). They advise the DCI. They also give advice and suggestions to other Intelligence Community components -- sometimes in the DCI's name, sometimes in their own.

At this writing there are 10 National Intelligence Officers.* A key element of the NIO concept, however, is that there is nothing sacrosanct about their number or the mix of their responsibilities. By design, both can be

* One for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, China, South and Southeast Asia and Africa, Japan and the Pacific, Strategic Programs, Conventional Forces, and Economics and Energy.

readily altered by a stroke of the DCI's pen. This provides an essential element of flexibility, ensuring that the DCI can easily keep his NIOs in tune with his needs and with our national leadership's areas of foreign policy concern.

On the DCI's behalf, the NIOs are responsible for maintaining continuing contact with the policy-level consumers of national intelligence to be sure these consumers' intelligence support needs are known and met. These consumers include the members of the National Security Council, its staff and ancillary committees, plus senior officials in the departments whose heads are members of the NSC. The NIOs are also responsible for maintaining continual contact with program managers throughout the Intelligence Community, and are expected to maintain contact with knowledgeable specialists outside the Government. Their function, in sum, is to be familiar with all of the US Government's intelligence capabilities and resources relating to their areas, plus the resources available outside the Government. They ensure that the full range of our national capabilities is brought to bear on foreign intelligence questions of major importance to our national leadership. On a continuing basis, each NIO is expected to keep the DCI apprised of the adequacy and effectiveness of the US Intelligence Community's work in his or her area, and to offer suggestions for its modification or improvement.

The NIOs are responsible to the DCI for the production of National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, Interagency Intelligence Memoranda, Alert Memoranda, and various other national assessments of varying degrees of formality. The actual drafting of most of these national products is done by officers and analysts throughout the Community, under the NIOs' aegis and supervision.

Again working with and through the Community, the NIOs are responsible for the annual preparation of the DCI's list of Key Intelligence Questions and for developing strategies to address each of these Questions. The NIOs also assist the DCI in preparing his annually issued "Perspectives for Intelligence."

In mid-1976, in response to problems that had arisen during the initial implementation of the NIO system, three major steps were taken.

1. A National Intelligence Steering Group chaired by the D/DCI/NI and including the heads of the major production components of the Intelligence Community was formed to review major production proposals and to ensure that the workload is properly and fairly distributed. The NIOs are not a production office and do not have their own independent drafting staff. They, therefore, borrow talent from line components and some intrusion on line officers is inevitable. The Steering Group is attempting to minimize the amount of this intrusion.

2. The Board of National Estimates was abolished in 1973 simultaneously with the creation of the NIOs. One criticism of the NIO system has been that its major products do not now receive any collegial review. To remedy this deficiency the D/DCI/NI is presently in the process of forming an Estimates Advisory Panel. This Panel will consist of approximately three dozen highly qualified people drawn from a variety of disciplines both from within and outside Government. They will review and comment on draft estimates before the estimate is officially sent to NFIB principals.

3. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has for some time been concerned that some of the key judgments in our major estimates on Soviet strategic forces and objectives were not as comprehensive as they might be and did not fully reflect alternate interpretations of Soviet forces and behavior. PFIAB requested, and the NIOs have undertaken, a project in competitive analysis. Three teams have been selected and are presently engaged in preparing alternate views on three selected areas of this year's national Soviet forces estimate.

It is as yet too early to judge how successful these three steps will be, but we expect to learn from these innovative procedures.

All of the NIOs are senior civilian or military professionals (slotted as GS-18s). Each has one assistant (GS-15) and one secretary. Collectively, the NIOs and their assistants are drawn from throughout the Community (and outside the Government). Both NIOs and their assistants serve on what are, in principle, two-year rotational assignments.

Appended to the NIO structure is a small Presentation and Publications Staff, which processes the national products prepared under the NIOs' aegis. This Staff also prepares all of the DCI's substantive briefings to the National Security Council or its ancillary committees (e.g., the WSAG).

Strength:

45 as of 12 November 1976

Funds:

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Executive Registry
76-5796/8

INSPECTOR GENERAL

11-0005

3 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary, DCI

FROM: John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Briefing of New DCI

REFERENCE: Briefing Format for the New DCI Dated
8 December 1976 (ER 76-5796)

I recommend that the following subjects relevant to the Inspector General's Office be discussed in my initial briefing of the DCI Designate:

- Inspector General responsibilities and functions
- Inspector General relationship with the Intelligence Oversight Board
- Problems:
 - (a) Residual problems of law and propriety
 - (b) Existing case with possible flap potential
 - (c) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence request to have access to the conclusions of IG reports
- Audit functions and responsibilities

TIME ESTIMATE: 35 Minutes

- CIA Task Force in support of investigations by the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations (particularly related to the assassination of the late President Kennedy)

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Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Deputy Inspector General and leader of the Task Force, will conduct this aspect of the briefing.

TIME ESTIMATE: 10 Minutes

OVERALL TIME FOR IG OFFICE BRIEFING: 45 Minutes




John H. Waller

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OGC 76-7379
22 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

FROM :
Deputy General Counsel


SUBJECT : Briefing for a new DCI

1. This is in response to your memorandum of 8 December 1976 requesting a list of subjects on which a formal briefing would be desirable.

2. In scheduling briefings for a new DCI, I suggest that you allow us one and a half hours. Mr. Lapham will conduct the briefing and will cover the legal authorities of the DCI and the Agency and the more important legal issues before us at this time. These include, but not necessarily in any order of importance, the following:

National Security Act and Central Intelligence Agency Act
Reporting Requirements of Executive Order 11905
Restrictions on Intelligence Activities under Executive
Order 11905
Relationships with the Attorney General and the Department
of Justice
Criminal Investigations Arising out of Employee Activities
in the Course of their Duties
Litigation Involving the Agency
Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Legal Questions Arising from Cover Requirements
Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods, including
Secrecy Agreements, Disclosures through Publication
and Criminal Code Protection
The Director's Extraordinary Expenditure Authority
Covert Action Findings

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DCI RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

DCI relations with Congress fall basically into the following areas: General Legislative Oversight, Appropriations, Covert Action, Substantive Intelligence Support, and Legislation.

I. GENERAL LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT

A. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) (15 members)

The SSCI was created by S. Res. 400 in the 94th Congress and has exclusive jurisdiction over CIA and sequential jurisdiction over the remainder of the Intelligence Community (IC) and has, basically, the following responsibilities: legislation; annual appropriation authorization (for the first time--previously funds were appropriated without an annual authorization); matters generally, including oversight to ensure policy makers get necessary, accurate and timely intelligence, and to ensure rights of American citizens are not infringed.

B. Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Subcommittee (7 members)

While this Subcommittee technically exercises general oversight jurisdiction, due to the advent of the SSCI, these responsibilities have de facto shifted to the new Committee. Even so, we are continuing to keep the Committee informed of IC matters generally. The Committee is especially kept informed on matters of foreign military intelligence. It will have an active role and influence on the authorization of IC appropriations.

C. House Armed Services Committee, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence (7 members)

This Subcommittee is responsible for legislation and matters generally other than appropriations with special emphasis to ensure the Subcommittee is kept currently informed of foreign intelligence developments with particular emphasis on foreign weaponry.

D. Ad Hoc Investigations

On occasion committees of Congress undertake special investigations which may touch on aspects of intelligence operations. For example, in the 95th Congress a House Select Committee will be investigating the assassination of President Kennedy, and the House Ethics Committee will be investigating Korean CIA activities.

II. APPROPRIATIONS OVERSIGHT

A. Senate Appropriations Committee, Intelligence Operations Subcommittee (5 members)

Since the Senate follows the House in the appropriations process, Senate action is generally limited to adjusting House figures. During the past few years, the Subcommittee has tended to restore some funds cut by the House. With the added staff interest in the intelligence budget, it should be possible to present IC arguments in such a way as to off-set decisions made by the House which adversely affect IC programs.

B. House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee (13 members)

This Subcommittee is responsible for the IC budget and its cost effectiveness. Its report is issued in a short unclassified statement and a very detailed classified annex. The Chairman, in fulfillment of his responsibilities to the House, has offered to all members of the House the right to see the IC budget and the Subcommittee report thereon.

C. Senate and House Budget Committees

Recent changes in the law provide for increased oversight of all Executive Branch budgets. It is uncertain at this time to what extent these Committees will be provided detailed access to IC budgets, but they no doubt will receive the total figures hopefully under a condition of non-disclosure.

III. COVERT ACTION

Recently enacted Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that appropriate committees of Congress (now seven), including the Subcommittees mentioned in I and II and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House International Relations (HIRC) Committee, receive reports on the scope and description of all covert action programs found necessary by the President.

--Proliferation of sensitive information. Under the above procedures, a minimum 56 Members of Congress will be informed of all covert action programs conducted under the direction of the President. In addition to such Members, the principal staff member of those subcommittees also attend such briefings. Also, SFRC and HIRC procedures allow any member of the full committee to receive information provided the subcommittees. Technically, all 435 members of the House have access to any committee records.

--Public release of covert action information. The proliferation of such information as outlined above has led to numerous instances where considerable information on covert action programs has been released to the public. Such release has jeopardized a number of programs and has led to the cancellation of at least one major program.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

A. Non-Oversight Committees

Under the current procedures, the IC briefs any committee on the substantive intelligence available on almost any subject requested. In doing so, however, no operational matters or sensitive intelligence which would reveal intelligence sources and methods is provided. When questions arise with respect to the latter, the committees are referred to the appropriate oversight subcommittees. In the past, certain committees were not satisfied with the procedures with respect to the refusal to provide operational or sensitive information; however, in most cases, they abided thereby.

B. Leadership and Individual Members of Congress

The IC has worked out a system whereby the Majority and Minority leaders of the House, and to a lesser extent Senate leadership, are kept currently informed of intelligence with respect to worldwide events of significance. In addition, individual members can and do ask for and receive briefings on a wide range of subjects of interest to them in formulating positions on proposed legislation and in preparation for trips abroad.

V. LEGISLATION

A. Draft Proposals Already Submitted

1. Intelligence Sources and Methods

--Purpose: The DCI has statutory responsibility to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. The lack of criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure continues to present a serious problem for the Government's National Foreign Intelligence Program. Recent publication of books and articles by persons having unauthorized access to sensitive intelligence information has damaged the Government's foreign intelligence efforts. Legislation establishing criminal sanctions for such unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods is considered to be a very important deterrent. It would not apply to an unauthorized recipient or the publication of the material by newsmen, etc.

--Status: The legislation was transmitted by the President to the 94th Congress and introduced as H.R. 12006, but no further action was taken.

2. Two Deputies

--Purpose: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the CIA and the positions of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Over the years, as the requirements, responsibilities and workload of the DCI have increased--particularly his duty to oversee and coordinate the functioning of the Intelligence Community--it has become increasingly apparent that a second statutory Deputy Director is needed if the DCI is to properly carry out his duties and to ensure the most effective functioning of U.S. foreign intelligence. The Rockefeller Commission recommended the creation of a second DDCI position. The President, in Executive Order 11905 (issued 18 February 1976), directed that the day-to-day functioning of the CIA be directed by the DDCI and that the position of "Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community" be established to assist the DCI in his supervision of the IC.

--Status: The proposed legislation was approved by OMB for transmittal to the Congress in September 1976.

B. Other Legislation

1. Charter Revision

The SSCI has created a subcommittee to study and propose charter revisions. The predecessor Church Committee recommended a number of charter changes.

2. Establishment of a Joint Committee on Oversight or House Select Committee on Intelligence

While the House exercises oversight over the IC, it has not set up machinery to take action to pull abreast of the Senate. Creation of a House version of the SSCI, if it had the necessary exclusive jurisdiction, would help diminish the proliferation of information. An even greater reduction could be accomplished through the establishment of a joint committee. This is extremely unlikely, however.

3. Repeal of Section 662 (Covert Action Reporting)

Since the purpose of a joint committee would be to concentrate oversight and avoid proliferation, repeal of Section 662 should be part and parcel of the joint committee legislation. However, in repealing Section 662, some provision must be made to protect the legitimate interests of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee in being aware of those matters which affect or support the foreign policy of the U.S.

4. Electronic Surveillance

The Administration supported a bill carefully drawn on this subject by Attorney General Levi and Senator Kennedy during the 94th Congress. While the bill did not reach the floor, it most likely will emerge during the next session and must be carefully monitored.

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CIA PROGRAMS, BUDGET AND MANPOWER

Organization of Office of Comptroller--basic responsibilities (5 minutes)

Relationship Between Intelligence Community Staff and Comptroller (5 minutes)

Budget Process in CIA (10 minutes)

- January Planning Review
- July Program Review: purpose, results--Financial Guidance Letters
- Preliminary CFI Review
- Joint OMB/CFI Review and Presidential Review: how the process works, your involvement
- Congressional Review: your involvement, problems
- Comptroller Meetings: purpose, participation, how they work
- The Contingency Reserve: what it is, how it works
- OMB and Congressional limitations on us

Status of the (Current) 1977 Budget (10 minutes)

Status of the 1978 Budget (20 minutes)

- Currently approved program
- Upcoming Congressional presentations: your involvement, likely major issues; need to consider more involvement of all senior Agency personnel in defending the budget; need to take position that Congress must give us a better opportunity to defend our budget.

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Directorate of Intelligence (DDI)

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Directorate of Operations (DDO)

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Directorate of Science & Technology (DDS&T)

DDS&T INTRODUCTORY BRIEFINGS FOR NEW DCI

DDS&T Overview	Dirks	2 hours
National Programs	<div></div>	1 hour
NPIC Visit	Hicks	3 hours
<div></div>		3 hours
Technical Support to Clandestine Operations	Brandwein	1 hour
CIA R&D Program	Dirks	1 hour
<div></div>		1 hour
DDS&T SIGINT Program	Hirsch	1 hour

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Directorate of Administration (DDA)

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Attachment No. 1
to DDA 76-6193

DDA BRIEFINGS TO BE CONDUCTED FOR THE NEW DCI

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>BRIEFER(S)</u>
Administrative Services Provided to the DCI; Other Personal Arrangements	1 Hour	John F. Blake
The Directorate of Administration, Organization and Function (Including Special Proprietaries)	2 Hours	John F. Blake
CIA Annual Personnel Plan (APP) and Personnel Development Program (PDP)	30 Minutes	John F. Blake (Fred Janney)
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 400px;"></div>	30 Minutes	John F. Blake <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 150px;"></div>
CIA Retirement Program Office of Finance Office of Personnel	30 Minutes	John F. Blake Thomas Yale <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 150px;"></div>
Office of Finance (Monetary Function)	30 Minutes	Thomas Yale

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Attachment No. 2
to DDA 76-6193

PERSONAL BRIEFINGS FOR THE DCI

Logistics

- a. Automobile and driver
- b. Telephone service in automobile
- c. Telephone service in residence

Security

- a. Courtesies afforded the DCI by the DCI Security Staff
- b. Authority and policy with reference to the DCI Security Staff carrying firearms



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- f. A recommendation relative to a residential site survey

Finance

- a. Pay and deductions
- b. Payroll timing and method
- c. Leave (and fact that as Presidential appointee, the Director is not under the leave system)
- d. Earnings and leave statements

Personnel

- a. Arrangements relating to appointment papers
- b. Insurance programs available
- c. Retirement
- d. Credit union
- e. Employee Activity Association
- f. Assistance available from Central Processing Branch
- g. Fitness room

Medical Services

- a. Medical records
- b. Medical examinations
- c. Consultant services available